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A B S T R A C T   
A significant gap exists between accident scenarios as foreseen by company safety management systems and 
actual scenarios observed in major accidents. 
The mere fact that this gap exists is pointing at flawed risk assessments, is leaving hazards unmitigated, 
threatening worker safety, putting the environment at risk and endangering company continuity. This scoping 
review gathers perspectives reported in scientific literature about how to address these problems. 
Safety managers and regulators, attempting to reduce and eventually close this gap, not only encounter the 
pitfalls of poor safety studies, but also the acceptance of ‘unknown risk’ as a phenomenon, companies being 
numbed by inadequate process safety indicators, unsettled debates between paradigms on improving process 
safety, and inflexible recording systems in a dynamic industrial environment. 
The immediacy of the stagnating long term downward major accident rate trend in the Netherlands underlines 
the need to address these pitfalls. A method to identify and systematically reduce unknown risks is proposed. The 
main conclusion is that safety management can never be ready with hazard identification and risk assessment.   
1. Introduction 
What lies beyond the border between known and unknown parts of 
the world around us is not merely a remote mystery. It affects us all in 
everyday life. We discover new things every day. Things outside our 
control happen to us every day. Accidents threaten our safety at work. 
We use the term “risk” to describe the product of probability and effect 
of an event that can cause harm to people and damage to plant and 
environment. The causes of frequent occupational accidents are usually 
rather well understood and countermeasures can be taken since they are 
known and available. This is not so in companies where complex pro-
cesses and installations are running in order to store, mix and produce 
hazardous chemical substances (Galen and Bellamy, 2015). There, right 
in front of our eyes, a mysterious unknown shows itself through observed 
events during major accidents (EC, 2012) which do not consistently 
match with foreseen accident scenarios (Kleindorfer et al., 2003; Dort, 
2016). This implies that a scenario gap exists. There are more scenarios 
than those which are being managed, and due to the phenomenon of 
entropic risk, the dynamic features of risk (Mol, 2003) and emerging tech-
nology (Kingston et al., 2016), new scenarios arise continuously. In other 
words, this gap shows between all the risks which are actually present, 
either known or unknown, and the risks that are actually being 
managed. The presence of this gap points at an incomplete risk in-
ventory, and at failing risk management (Hubbard, 2009). This notion is 
significant since major accidents pose a near to constant level of threat to 
society in the Netherlands and Belgium over the past decades (Swuste 
and Reniers, 2017; Reniers and Khakzad, 2017; Veld, 2015). After a 
preceding period of dropping accident rates, this ‘plateau’ indicates that 
major accident prevention and reduction activities fall short for as yet 
unexplained reasons and that further improvement of risk control is 
necessary (Le Coze, 2013). The authors contend that the scenario gap 
covers a significant part of these unexplained reasons. 
In this study the authors explore “unknown risks” and propose a way 
to systematically deal with such risks. Rather than providing answers, 
the authors concentrate on questions generated by many paradigms and 
approaches in current safety science. This leads to an unconventional – 
narrative – structure of the findings, describing the path the authors 
followed. In the analysis section several examples are included, known 
to the general public, in order to explain the philosophical line of 
thinking. By means of a proposed scale and a range of identified process 
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industry related unmitigated hazards (Lindhout and Reniers, 2017A), 
the authors construct a method to act on these not – or not fully miti-
gated hazards. Preliminary results of this work were presented at the 
2019 Loss Prevention Conference (Lindhout, 2019A). 
1.1. Problem definition 
The mere presence of the scenario gap and associated unidentified 
hazards points at flawed risk assessments and, perhaps even more 
important, at flawed risk assessment approaches. The authors consider 
knowledge of paramount importance when controlling risks. A danger 
should be identified and sufficiently understood before it can be effec-
tively dealt with as a controlled risk. Both company safety management 
and regulator activities need improvement on this point (Le Coze, 2013; 
Veld, 2015). Safety managers and regulators, attempting to reduce and 
eventually close this gap, encounter several pitfalls in safety 
management. 
The first one is a poor safety study, generated by a company to 
establish its risk inventory and take appropriate safety measures. The 
resulting risk assessments can be incomplete for many reasons. General 
risk assessment practice has a focus on worst case scenarios. Choosing the 
rather unlikely scenario with the largest impact out of a group of similar 
but smaller impact scenario’s as representative for all of them, ignores 
part of their variety. Hence such a choice can be baffling, hiding and 
obscuring the actual and more likely smaller accident risks (Dort, 2016; 
Kleindorfer et al., 2003). Companies measuring their safety performance 
can become a victim of the McNamara fallacy (Kingston-Howlett and 
Dien, 2017) which is associated with being numbed by inadequate 
process safety indicators. Companies simply get the wrong – usually too 
optimistic – impression of their efforts and of the effects their safety 
management system has on company safety. 
A risk inventory can be incomplete thanks to a lack of ‘risk appetite’ 
(Gjerdrum and Peter, 2011), meaning that insufficient depth is achieved 
in the investigation of risks which are present in the company processes, 
installations and management systems. Lindhout and Gulijk (2011) 
noticed that the challenge of “unknown risk” is often treated along the 
line of “fully unknown, hence we cannot act on it”. Chemical companies 
in nearly all cases appear to be dealing with “partly unknown risk”, 
leaving the know part unattended. 
Widely spread is poor learning from accidents (Lindhout et al., 2019; 
Lindhout and Gulijk, 2011), leading to underrepresentation of known 
accident scenario’s which have happened in accidents in the past in 
situations similar to those in the company concerned. 
Accidents are traditionally allocated to technical causes, for example 
leakage due to corrosion. The importance of non-technical causation in 
scenarios is being underestimated, for instance due to language issues 
which can cause misunderstandings (Lindhout and Gulijk, 2011) or due 
to unsafe risk taking behaviour (Flin et al., 2000). A scenario is not al-
ways originating from a single point failure. It is not uncommon for 
companies to be only looking at single failures only rather than also at 
multiple factor causation and systemic risk (Edwards et al., 2012). This 
leads to formulating risks rather generally, thus hiding ‘the devil in the 
details’. Finally, scenarios may simply be overlooked and escape atten-
tion during the often comprehensive analyses companies undertake to 
build their risk inventory. 
Secondly, there is the kind of risk that is conceivable but at the same 
time considered to be extremely unlikely. Therefore any effort to reduce 
such risk is deemed as a waste of time and money. Hence, experts might 
acknowledge such a scenario but do nothing about it except for 
accepting it as residual risk for economic reasons (Ale and Mertens, 
2012). 
Thirdly, some risks are not fully understood. Not all about a danger 
might be known. The associated risks remain unidentified for a part or 
perhaps even in its entirety, no matter how hard the company safety 
experts try. There can be unknown risk (Lindhout and Reniers, 2017A), 
of which one can either be aware, hence it should be named 
‘known-unknown’ risk, or unaware, hence to be called ‘unknown-un-
known’ risk (Petersen et al., 2013) (See also Fig. 1). Although essential 
for dealing with the latter mysterious and sinister ‘unk-unk’ problems - 
because unknown does not necessarily mean not foreseeable - such a 
distinction is rarely made (Ramasesh and Browning, 2014). 
Arguably the fourth pitfall is the claim that some risks are normal 
(Perrow, 1984, 2011bib_Perrow_1984bib_Perrow_2011) or not foresee-
able (Galen and Bellamy, 2015), e.g. due to the sheer number of possibly 
harmful combinations of conditions or events, and the interdependency or 
interaction (Ale et al., 2014) between the many elements in the complex 
systems of chemical process plants. Funtowicz and Ravetz (1990), 
Paté-Cornell (1996) and Petersen et al. (2013) mention several kinds of 
uncertainties leading to imprecise-, unreliable-, statistically variating- 
and even unknown elements in company assessments of foreseeable 
risks. This suggests that foreseeable risks might have a not foreseeable 
part associated with them. 
The fifth pitfall is entropic risk (Mol, 2003) and the dynamic aspects of 
risks; instead of snapshots of which risk assessment approaches are 
focused upon today. Movies of risk (levels) should be made by using 
dynamic risk assessment techniques and approaches since situations and 
circumstances change all the time, hence also their associated risks. 
Obviously any unknown risk, as a result from either of these pitfalls, 
is probably at the same time an unmitigated danger, or, from current 
safety management systems point of view, an uncontrolled risk. Such a 
risk jeopardises effective major accident prevention by the safety engi-
neer and threatens worker safety, it puts the environment in harms way 
and endangers company continuity. 
1.2. This study deals with the question 
What can the safety engineer in the chemical industry do about un-
known risks? 
2. Method 
Exploring ‘unknown risks’ poses a challenge to traditional methods 
for systematic literature review. A body of knowledge with harmonized 
and settled terminology does not exist here (Ören, 2005). 
Therefore the authors did not aim for a systematic review but chose 
instead to explore literature as available via Research Gate, Academia 
and Google Scholar with associated proprietary databases. 
We applied the scoping review technique (Smith et al., 2015) and 
used a screening process (Byrne et al., 2016; Byrne, 2016) with search 
terms and in/exclusion criteria. To this end several consecutive searches 
were done, using progressively refined and combined (sub-)sets of 
search terms, derived from the introduction- and problem definition 
sections. 
Since the research question concerns the present day discourse, the 
search time period was set to 2010–2020. Due to their particular rele-
vance, a few sources published before the year 2010 were admitted. 
The initial search terms were: “Chemical industry, safety risk assess-
ment, major accidents, risk inventory, unidentified scenario, paradigm”. 
From the initial search result, sorted on relevance, the first 200 sources 
were screened to find relevant sources and new search terms. Then, 
successive searches with different combinations of the terms “dropping 
accident rate, learning from accidents, worst case, systemic risk, residual risk, 
unlikely risk, uncertain risk, unknown risk, not foreseeable risk, interde-
pendent risks, entropic risk, dynamic risk, emerging technology risk, unknown 
risk” were used to further refine the search. 
Finally, further sources were identified via reference listings of 
sources as encountered. 
The quality of the sources admitted is safeguarded by selection of 
primary and secondary scientific sources (Cronin et al., 2008) as an 
inclusion criterion. By exception, because of their relevance, also a few 
tertiary sources (Wessels, 1997) were admitted. The authors analyse 
current thinking about safety by asking questions about paradigms being 
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debated, problem solutions being proposed, how to proceed and in 
which direction to move. 
Then, looking for a way forward, and inspired by Peirce (1867), Le 
Coze (2013), Gowland (2011), Hansen (2018) and Lindhout (2019A), 
the authors propose a philosophy based map of reality. To this end they 
construct an existence field in the major accident prevention world. 
Unknown, hence uncontrolled risks can be depicted as phenomena in 
this field, depending on their position or movement along an 
unknown-ness scale. The field and scale are combined into a tool to select 
a suitable action approach for each (partly) unknown risk. 
An example taken from an inventory of ‘known-unknown’ risks as 
derived from lived experiences in the chemical industry by Lindhout 
(2019A) and several general examples are assessed with this scale. 
Finally, the discussion section sketches a way forward towards more 
complete risk assessments. 
3. Results 
Several successive questions guided the authors during this study. 
The path they followed is described in this section as a narrative account 
of the exploratory process the authors went through. Many questions 
were found rather than answers. 
3.1. How to handle unknown risks? 
An Accident is basically a sequence of events leading to the release of 
energy or toxicity in an unwanted and uncontrolled way. Such a 
sequence is usually referred to as a scenario. In a complex high-risk 
chemical process plant, many accident scenarios are possible. 
The EPSC (European Process Safety Centre) places such a scenario in 
a matrix of awareness versus knowledge, each being either known or 
unknown (Fig. 1). In the resulting square the unknown may be at the 
awareness side, then requiring constant attention, keeping a sense of 
vulnerability and conducting safety studies. It may also be at the 
knowledge side, then requiring academic and industrial research. When 
both sides of a scenario are unknown, everything is needed, together 
with creativity and a pro-active approaches around the question “what 
else?” (Gowland, 2011). Clearly the position chosen by the EPSC is not a 
vote for merely accepting “unknown risk” as a fact of life, neither is it a 
vote for regarding it as a phenomenon which safety management will 
not be able to do anything about. 
3.2. What about the paradigm debate? 
So, how to go about this? Here, unsettling debates between para-
digms are overwhelming the safety engineer with many questions about 
how to deal with (partly) unknown risks:  
• Is what safety management currently does about safety in High-Risk 
Organisations still effective, sensible and logical (Le Coze, 2013; 
Hopkins, 2014; Kampen et al., 2018)?  
• Should we run process plants as if they were nuclear submarines 
(Bierly and Spender, 1995)?  
• Would safety clutter be the first problem to solve (Rae et al., 2018)?  
• Is safety culture as a concept (“the way we do things around here”) 
really clear, well understood, effective and useable in practice for 
everyone involved (Hopkins, 2018; Vierendeels et al., 2018)? 
• Are companies considering safety as a priority or as a value (Rat-
ilainen et al., 2018)? 
• Can safety management keep up with the pace of emerging technolo-
gies including all of its new risks (Kingston-Howlett et al., 2016; 
Pillay, 2015; Leveson, 2004)? 
• Is the ongoing multiple phenomena degradation of process in-
stallations sufficiently well understood to be able to both increase 
production volumes and keep it safe while moving beyond the original 
process plant design life time (Selnes and Ersdal, 2011)?  
• Might safety managers for some reason ignore any risks (Gjerdrum 
and Peter, 2011)?  
• What risk is still hidden, unforeseeable or unknown with the current 
knowledge, methods and systems at the disposal of safety manage-
ment (Lindhout and Reniers, 2017A)?  
• Are risks dynamic rather than static and might they be continuously 
changing (Mol, 2003)?  
• Is there enough and adequate collaboration and transparency, so that 
practitioners learn from each others near misses and incidents (Gnoni 
and Lettera, 2012)?  
• Is there adequate inspection and are company safety management 
systems being improved adequately based on lessons learnt from 
accidents (Accou and Reniers, 2019)? 
3.3. Which problem solutions are proposed ? 
Many solutions are being proposed, resulting in as many questions:  
• Is our mental model requiring a turn towards ‘total respect’ (Blokland 
and Reniers, 2017)?  
• Is it all merely a matter of perception (Slovic and Weber, 2002)?  
• Should regulator inspectors be less soft and cooperative and exert 
more pressure, choosing the hard line instead (Kelman and Hong, 
2016)?  
• Or do we most of all need to improve on what we are doing in terms of 
gathering evidence (Sun, 2012)?  
• Or might it be the anticipatory thinking (Klein et al., 2007) we need to 
embrace? 
Fig. 1. Knowledge, Awareness and what to do about accident scenarios (after Gowland, 2011).  
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• Is it possible to avoid problems by more emphasis on safety during 
the design phase (Husin et al., 2017)?  
• Could process installations be made completely inherently safe 
(Ahmad et al., 2017; Nemet et al., 2018)?  
• Or can we just cover any uncontrolled risk with resilience engineering 
(Hollnagel et al., 2011; Haavik et al., 2016; Sujan, 2018; Hopkins, 
2014; Pillay 2017; Wiig and Fahlbruch, 2018; Leveson, 2004)?  
• Can we mathematically predict the effects of uncertainties via 
evidential or credal network analyses (Misuri et al., 2018)?  
• Are risk assessments getting better with ‘Safety-II’ in mind and 
looking for what goes well (Hollnagel, 2014; Sujan et al., 2017)?  
• Would it be possible to rule out human error in situations requiring 
fast and smart response to unforeseen danger (Bellamy, 2018)?  
• Can we still rely on safety culture to further reduce accident rates 
(Groeneweg et al., 2010; Guldenmund, 2018; Vierendeels et al., 
2018).  
• Could safety culture be enhanced by nudges to induce safer behaviour 
on voluntary- and even involuntary basis (Lindhout and Reniers, 
2017B; Sunstein et al., 2017)?  
• Will industry be prepared to embark on integrated design-based 
safety and security, using a collaborative approach between competi-
tors and deploy cluster teams (Reniers and Amyotte, 2012; Reniers 
and Khakzad, 2017)?  
• Should we use more artificial intelligence and sensor technology aimed 
at monitoring process safety with a big-data ‘nervous system’ which 
continuously generates real-time scenario safety state warnings in 
chemical plants (Uraikul et al., 2007). In other words: why don’t we 
detect increased risk before any containment is lost (Leveson and 
Stephanopoulos, 2014)?  
• Indeed, could the proactive instant measuring of (un)safety conditions 
(Blokland and Reniers, 2019) become the next new paradigm in 
succession of safety culture?  
• So, is it simply a matter of ‘safety-intelligence’, providing a constant 
stream of information about error producing conditions to educate 
the top executive level (Kirwan, 2008)? 
• Or is meticulously following the ISO-31000 risk management stan-
dard, prescribing the identification of all risks, really the best we can 
do about the new challenges chemical industry has created since the 
1960-ties (Lalonde and Boiral, 2012; Pillay, 2018)?  
• Looking at the many alternative safety management system designs 
(Li and Guldenmund, 2018), could the currently prescribed seven 
elements architecture in the Seveso III Directive hold back company 
risk mitigation performance?  
• What about the relation between safety and security (Reniers and 
Khakzad, 2017; Casson Moreno et al., 2018)?  
• Must we keep hunting for black swans (Taleb, 2007; Murphy and 
Conner, 2012; Ale et al., 2020)?  
• Is it all about the art of using the right risk assessment tools and even 
modifying them for specific situations like interacting risks (Lyon 
and Popov, 2016; Dallat et al., 2017)? 
• Or are we to embrace mindfulness and seek new thinking and an in-
tegrated perspective on risk (Aven and Krohn, 2014)?  
• Could human intuition, expressed via fuzzy bow-tie models (Zarei 
et al., 2019), improve risk assessments?  
• Would it be enough to work with the 4 assurances that all technology 
used is state of the art, management is committed to safety, 
improvement is continuous and personnel is highly competent 
(Danner and Schulman, 2018)?  
• Apparently the introduction of 12 life saving rules significantly helps 
to reduce incidents, so why not taking these up in all Safety Man-
agement Systems (Groeneweg and Dijk, 2011)?  
• Could an entropic risk model (Mol, 2003), based on dynamic risk 
assessments and continuous risk monitoring, using big-data and new 
communication technology, help to deal with varying risks?  
• Would the systematic multi-paradigm approach via the Cynefin model 
(Blokland and Reniers, 2013, p106; Snowden, 1999; Kurtz and 
Snowden, 2003) always converge situations with disorder and chaos 
towards controlled risk? 
3.4. How to proceed? 
It would seem none of these proposed ways to proceed will cover the 
entire problem behind the scenario gap by themselves. Reniers and 
Khakzad (2017) indicate though that their new multi-paradigm approach 
they call “CHESS”, could lead to major improvements through a com-
bination of several of the above mentioned strategies. However, it is 
unlikely to be successful in the short term. After a considerable while, 
practice will reveal whether their combined use has an improvement – i. 
e. reduction – effect on unsafety or accident rates. Moreover, this should 
preferably have an impact on safety, besides on unsafety. 
Also merely extrapolating the past and using an evidence-only 
approach (Pawson et al., 2011) seems not enough to foresee what’s next. 
For instance, there is doubt whether we can learn enough from accidents 
and near misses even if we capture all there is to learn from them 
(Lindhout and Gulijk, 2011; Leveson, 2004). This doubt comes from the 
notion that we still rely on fixed accident causality recording methods 
while the pace, in which new technology, insights and methods emerge, 
indicates that we are entering a fourth industrial revolution (Schwab, 
2015). 
This gives rise to even more questions:  
• Should we -first of all-reconsider the way the regulator operates as it 
is creating its own disasters (Black, 2014)?  
• Is it sensible to let risks be managed by those that take them for their 
own economic benefit, and then rely on eight key principles to solve 
government risk policy problems (Aven and Renn, 2018)?  
• As we travel with a lack of knowledge in our dangerous, strange, 
new, complex, interconnected and changing world, are we to revert 
back to fearing the unknown, just like ancient explorers saying to one 
another: ‘here be Dragons’ (Elahi, 2011)?  
• Or do we need to pull ourselves together and move beyond the 
simple two dimensional dread versus familiarity factor space, towards 
a values based, inclusive, social and psychological model of risk 
perception (Taylor-Gooby and Zinn, 2006)?  
• Is it even feasible to cover all risks in the economy driven hyperbolic 
risk space we seem to live in (Mendel et al., 2015; Reniers and Van 
Erp, 2016)?  
• Assuming we could ever be ready and there is a future moment we 
will think we have done all the work, could we know whether our 
search for dangers is actually complete (Cantrell and Clemens, 2009)?  
• Looking at the permanent influx of new risks a. o. Due to dynamic 
and entropic properties of risk (Mol, 2003), could we indeed ever be 
ready?  
• Would there be, however hard we try to get there, an ‘unknowable’ 
realm we can never get to (Pawson et al., 2011)?  
• Could incorporation of epistemology and philosophy come to our 
rescue (Le Coze, 2013)? 
3.5. What is on the horizon? 
The rather bizarre consequence of the current probabilistic thinking 
is that such a thing as a major accident scenario, with its many predicted 
casualties and major economical damage, could not only exist but also 
be regarded as broadly acceptable to society, since its risks are properly 
controlled (HSE, 2001, p43). Such a scenario could still lead to a major 
accident however, since there often is a residual risk to consider and 
accept. Residual risk frustrates the safety managers’ effort, invested in 
prevention activities. The safety engineer might wonder whether re-
sidual risk is an adversary too strong to fight against. Part of this ad-
versary might be the cognitive bias included in the new but trusted 
big-data safety monitoring systems (Burggraaf et al., 2019). Are safety 
engineers getting lost in a safety desert, not knowing in which direction 
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to move (Lindhout, 2019B)? This leads to more questions yet again.  
• If all risks are managed to residual risk level, does this thinking imply 
a threshold accident rate level we would never drop below (Mol, 
2003)? Would these be the ‘normal accidents’ (Perrow, 1984) of the 
future?  
• And is that threshold level then collectively creating a hard core of 
many knowingly and consciously taken risks, yet each individually 
extremely improbable major accidents? Or is the residue a left-over 
set of minor accidents no longer holding major accident risk con-
tent? Would unknown risk really be “the safety engineers’ best and 
final offer” (Lindhout, 2019A)?  
• While entering a ‘new adaptive age of safety’, would there still be 
more to learn from accidents via organisational learning (Gillman and 
Pillay, 2018)?  
• Could total safety management (Goetsch, 1998; Kontogiannis et al., 
2017), systems theory (Leveson, 2004; Chi and Han, 2013) or game 
theory (Song et al., 2020; Reniers et al., 2009) lead to a much needed 
break through in our approach of making a risk inventory?  
• Is probabilistic thinking holding the safety managers’ endeavour 
back and is - by default - the deterministic approach the only escape 
here, or might fuzzy Bayesian networks (Zarei et al., 2019) and alike, 
e.g. Petri-nets (Zhou and Reniers, 2018; Yazdi and Darvishmotevali, 
2019), help us to clear our view on hazards?  
• Or would risk-homeostasis (Delatour et al., 2014; Rasmussen, 1997) 
make any further effort by safety science pointless anyway? 
3.6. Dead in the water ? 
When it comes to perception of major accident risks, society un-
complainingly accepts much greater every day risks, certainly when 
comparing to their overall yearly consequences found in accident sta-
tistics on damage and casualties (RIVM, 2003). Society tends to forget 
rare incidents and is suddenly awakening each time one happens. The 
bright flashing effect of a single major incident outshines the glow of 
many smaller incidents. Society appears to react much stronger to the 
rare flashes than to the always present glow. The authors contend that 
society has not yet reached equilibrium between economy and safety, 
and at the same time wonder whether this conundrum might be solvable 
after all (Reniers and Van Erp, 2016)? The way forward is unclear 
anyhow. 
It comes as no surprise that Taylor-Gooby and Zinn (2006) conclude 
that risk research suffers from a wide range of perspectives. It would 
seem that the drops in industrial accident rates since the nineteen fifties, 
following the successive introductions of safety technology, safety 
management and safety culture, have arrived at a plateau (Hudson, 
2007; Swuste and Reniers, 2017; Reniers and Khakzad, 2017; Le Coze, 
2013). Without an effective theoretical framework about (normal) ac-
cidents and high reliability organisations (HRO) (Hopkins, 2014), with 
stagnating accident rates, many new thinking directions in all sorts of 
directions and probabilistic methods making rare accidents a legitimate 
phenomenon, the safety engineer appears to be standing clueless at 
crossroads. 
So, are safety specialists at their whit’s end here? Would this be the 
end of safety science as we know it? Are they at the limits of what is 
humanly possible in terms of risk control in the chemical industry? Is it 
getting impossible to reconcile the differences between scientific-, so-
cial-, ethical-, economical- and technical insights when it comes to a 
complete and properly controlled risk inventory? Are they facing an 
impenetrable territory of ignorance? Confronted with all these thinking 
directions, safety science seems to be stuck in a liminal space (Lapadat, 
2017), remaining indecisive, not knowing what direction to go, floating 
‘dead in the water’. Safety science seems in desperate need of a new 
paradigm at the brink of the third safety revolution (Reniers and Khakzad, 
2017). Can safety engineers perform a “Von Munchhausen act” (Raspe, 
1785) and pull themselves out of this existential swamp? 
On the contrary - in the authors view - many possibilities still exist to 
achieve improvement through all of the above, but this requires 
inquisitiveness and a generally applicable method allowing the safety 
engineer to systematically work on hitherto deemed ‘unknown’ - and left 
alone - risks. 
4. Analysis 
4.1. Phenomena and existence field 
Wondering where to go next, the authors contend that it would seem 
practical to proceed with the hitherto barely touched unknown risk part 
in the scenario gap problem. It is the realm where ideas about future 
developments and new risks, like the ones originating from emerging- 
and ageing technology, come together. It was Le Coze (2013) calling 
upon epistemology and philosophy to come to our rescue here. 
Still ‘dead in the water’, the unknown could become the safety en-
gineers’ new horizon… 
Philosophy may offer a proverbial ‘tow-boat’ here. Already the 
earliest scientific thinking about the world, as we experience it around 
us, included a notion that there is more than we are aware of. Something 
that the Greek philosophers would consider as a known part of physical 
reality, appearing from direct observation via the senses, was labelled a 
‘phenomenon’. Any remaining, assumed to be existing but as yet un-
discovered part of reality was called ‘noumenon’ (Kant, 1781; Warbur-
ton, 2011). Science in general and phenomenology in particular, are 
geared to discover and understand phenomena coming from this 
mysterious realm (Merleau-Ponty, 1945). Although some phenomena 
may not immediately appear (Heidegger, 1927), and much of the phe-
nomenologists’ effort is focused on investigating subjective lived expe-
rience in people’s lives, rather than facts in the physical world, the basic 
question in phenomenology: “How does the world appear to human con-
sciousness?” (Husserl, 1969) might be helpful to explore undiscovered 
things in safety science. This differs from the stance taken by the sci-
entists in physics, when they empirically explore ‘the real world’ beyond 
what is currently detectable with human senses and their extensions in 
the form of technical equipment (Humphreys, 2004). But how to reach 
for the unknown of which we are ignorant? 
In line with current mainstream philosophical thinking, reality can 
be mapped with any sure known ‘phenomenon’ in the centre, transi-
tionally less known concentric domains around it, and a completely 
unknown, ‘noumenon’ domain at its outskirts (Hansen, 2018), as shown 
in Fig. 2. A complete ‘saturated’ phenomenon (Marion, 2002) can consist 
of parts scattered over the different domains in this existence field. Some 
part of a phenomenon is known, some of it is not fully known, some of it 
is not known though knowable, some of it is not known at all. 
In each of these domains a different strategy is required to move 
knowledge about what is going on there in the direction from the un-
known outer rim towards the known area in the centre (1). The centre 
represents the every day world where cognition and practice rule, where 
empirical science can build evidence. The first domain around the centre 
is an area dominated by ontology (2), where we need suspiciousness, 
wondering, learning, debating, and finding new words to describe things 
not seen before. The next domain, another step further from the centre, 
is the realm of intuition (3), coincidental discovery and changing our 
values and views on the world. Even further ‘out there’, is the unknown 
domain (4) where mystery and wonder rule (Hansen, 2018). Here pas-
sive listening is needed, receiving apophatic experiences and events 
where a phenomenon might show itself. Wondering and looking at the 
world like a child without prior knowledge. This dark and mysterious 
realm requires apophatic thinking and keeping an open mind, looking 
for what is not said and what is hidden in between the lines (Arendt, 
1978). Postulating an even more distant domain (5) in order to make the 
distinction between knowable and unknowable has little practical 
meaning since the latter – if existing at all – can neither be known nor 
dealt with (Ramasesh and Browning, 2014). In Fig. 2 this distinction is 
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indicated with a dashed outer perimeter. 
Everyday life examples of safety related phenomena and potential 
phenomena A to E, scattered over the concentric reality map domains 
(1) to (5), are shown in Fig. 2. An example of a danger exclusively 
residing in domain (5) cannot be given. 
Example A is a phenomenon not immediately visible to the naked eye 
but discovered a long time ago: thermal expansion of materials. This 
physical effect was e.g. used to shrink wrought iron threads on wooden 
spoke wheels. Very little remains unknown about this and as a phe-
nomenon it resides in domain (1) touching at the border of domain (2) 
since each new material needs investigation. 
Example B is a partly known and partly to be further investigated 
phenomenon: risk taking behaviour. It varies with many personal, cul-
tural and other aspects (Ji et al., 2018). It sits for a small part in domain 
(1) but mainly in domain (2) as there is much left to be better understood 
(Flin et al., 2000). 
Example C, the safety hazards associated with Artificial Intelligence (A. 
I.), robotics and the internet of things, are only partly known and under 
control. These emerging technologies also invade industry, including 
chemical plants, and bring as yet unknown dangers along with them. 
They are subject of many studies (Burggräf et al., 2018) to learn more 
about them since part of its hazards are currently not known. And there 
is more. The fear that A.I. could get a mind of its own and act on that, 
that A.I. might fall into the hands of the wrong people, or economically 
disrupt society, is no longer mere science fiction. Several years ago 
scientists started to realise there are potential risks A.I. holds which are 
not understood or known. Steven Hawking (2014; 2017; 2018) identi-
fied these as a matter of serious concern. As A.I. is expected to supersede 
human intelligence one day, machines might disclose parts of reality 
that remain unknowable to mankind. This leads to A.I. depicted as a 
partly understood and partly potential saturated phenomenon residing in 
domains (1), (2), (3), (4) and (5). 
Example D, an accident cause not yet revealed, is unknown except for 
its suspected existence, and resides in domains (3) and (4). In Arizona, a 
self-driving vehicle killed a pedestrian in March 2018 but it took until 
May 2018 for the mysterious cause – a software glitch – to become clear 
(Efrati, 2018). 
Example E is a danger, currently not known to man, that could either be 
discovered or not. It waits in domain (4) and may have a part in (5). 
Radiation sickness was an example of such unknown danger in the years 
before 1900, when ionising radiation was only just discovered. It was 
Marie Curie warning for its health effects after she had damaged her 
fingertips, and had contracted leukaemia. She died of radiation sickness 
in 1934 (Goldsmith, 2004). 
4.2. Risk unknown-ness scale 
As (Kloman (1992, p300) already wrote in the early nineties: “… 
Perhaps the real objective of risk management is to reduce fear of the un-
known and the unexpected, and to create confidence in the future”. Reniers 
and Khakzad (2017), when facing the many unanswered questions about 
how to break free of the ‘plateau’ and start to improve safety again, 
conclude that “… In order to truly advance safety a paradigm shift is 
needed”. 
Preparing for the unexpected requires things like attention for weak 
signals (Delatour et al., 2013), embracing failure in its full depth and 
detail and – preferably – having hands-on knowledge of the plant to 
really understand what is going on (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007). Like 
accidents, also risks can be classified by type. Terms such as major ac-
cidents (Veld, 2015), black swans (Taleb, 2007) and normal accidents 
(Perrow, 1984) are often used. Important lessons are being learned via 
this thinking. 
A safety engineer would handle uncertainties in knowledge and data 
as an attribute of a known phenomenon or risk. Such uncertainty would 
e.g. refer to variation of a quantifiable parameter or a not precisely 
determined probability of an event (Paté-Cornell, 1994, 
1996bib_Paté_Cornell_1994bib_Paté_Cornell_1996). 
For this study though, in our endeavour to support the safety engi-
neer while exploring the unknown domains of process plants reality, a 
generally applicable scale indicating ‘unknown-ness’ is needed. In order 
to look at movement in the continuous knowledge flow associated with 
increasing awareness, and with moving from unknown (noumenon) 
towards the known (phenomenon), at least some stepping stones be-
tween the two extremes, as already acknowledged by the Greek phi-
losophers, would come in handy. Peirce (1867), the founder of 
“pragmatism”, used a simple three stages approach for this and coined 
them Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness. Firstness is about a condition, 
existence, possibility, not yet thought about, understood or described. 
Secondness is about emerging relations between facts and observable 
things, exposing differences, objects and interactions. Thirdness is about 
recognizing patterns, allowing naming, connecting, grouping, classifi-
cation, arranging, explaining, predicting and anticipating. In other 
words: something is almost. 
Getting known to the extent needed to identify it as a phenomenon. 
Fig. 2. Reality: a map of the world around us in five domains with example phenomena (Derived from: Hansen, 2018). UU, KU, UK and KK refer to Fig. 1 quadrants.  
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Peirce (1867) three stages between phenomenon and noumenon 
compare rather well to the four domains in the reality field map, 
reflecting current mainstream philosophical thinking (Hansen, 2018), as 
is shown in Table 1. The unknown-ness scale is designed to structure a 
description of the current company situation of - as yet not fully known 
and not properly mitigated - risk at a particular moment. In this study we 
use the domains 1 to 5 and a merged description of ways to gather 
knowledge in each of the domains. 
4.3. Uncontrolled risks inventory 
Lindhout and Reniers (2017A) present an inventory of unmitigated 
hazards as derived from regulator experience in the Dutch chemical 
industry. Out of the 44 unknown risks they present, one is ‘unknow-
n-unknown’ and one is a hypothetical, well known and controlled 
generic risk that qualifies as a phenomenon. They mark respectively the 
upper (domain 5) and lower (domain 1) extremes of the unknown-ness 
scale. The other 42 risks are in between and belong in the transitional 
domains (2), (3) and (4) since they have some sort of awareness, a 
named condition or a consciously made choice, associated with them. 
Lindhout and Reniers (2017A) analyse these 42 risks (See Table 2) 
and show that some of them are more known than unknown, and 
therefore already qualify as a ‘phenomenon’. Hence, some 9 of these 42 
risks are not only suitable for direct investigation but also for taking 
action. 
Out of the remaining risks, some 18 can be allocated to domain (2) on 
the scale since they have a mix of known properties and identified at-
tributes on the one hand and a lack of knowledge on the other for spe-
cific and identified aspects. 
A further 9 risks can be allocated to Domain (3) on the scale because, 
apart from conditions and possibilities in which these hazards might 
come to expression, little more is known about them. 
This leaves some 7 risks in domain (4) with only awareness of their 
existence as a basis. 
In Table 2 this set of uncontrolled risks found in the Dutch chemical 
industry is grouped (but not prioritized) according to the unknown-ness 
scale in Table 1 in the domains (1) up to (5). 
This set of uncontrolled risks compiled from experience can be used 
by the safety engineer as a starting point. The inventory list can be 
extended with company specific issues as necessary. Actions can be 
allocated and progress can be monitored. This opens up the possibility 
for the safety engineer to also work with (partly) unknown danger in a 
structured way using a risk inventory and action list (RIAL). 
4.4. Proposed action approach 
The proposed way to go about using Table 2 based action approach is 
detailed in sections 5.4 and an example is included in section 5.5. 
For each of the domains on the scale the most important action 
needed to achieve reduction of an unknown, uncontrolled risk is to find 
out more about it and move it along the “unknown-ness” scale – and 
towards the top of Table 2 – in the direction of a well understood phe-
nomenon, at domain (1)/Practice. There, among known phenomena, an 
identified danger can be taken up as an action by safety management so 
the previously uncontrolled risk can be brought under control. This can 
be done with conventional methods for identification of risks and defi-
nition of appropriate measures (ISO, 2009; EC, 2012). 
In practice this is not immediately possible for all uncontrolled risks 
in domain (2), (3) and (4). The further up the scale, the more difficult it 
will be to move them towards domain (1). For hazards in domain (2)/ 
Learn, measures can often not yet be taken since there is insufficient 
knowledge available to define them. The most important action to be 
taken here is investigating the hazard in order to gain understanding and 
bring them to domain (1). Then design and implementation of measures 
becomes possible. 
Hazards in domain (3)/Intuition, can not be directly investigated and 
brought to domain (1). The domain (3) hazards require both attention 
and time. In terms of action, the safety engineer can take such hazards 
up in a structure to gather information, make records of observations, 
and be on the look-out for situations where they could emerge. A new 
way of thinking might be needed to enable understanding and gain 
insight (Hansen, 2018). The objective here would be to bring a domain 
(3) hazard towards domain (2) in due course. 
Hazards in domain (4)/Mystery, are foggy and fuzzy and they 
require curiosity and creativity to somehow get a grip on them. This is 
where a what-if session, creativity or serendipity while talking about 
something could make all the difference. An open mind is needed since 
information about hazards can suddenly appear at unexpected times and 
places (Csikszentmihalyi, 1996; Hansen, 2018). These bits and pieces 
may indicate what to look for though. The objective here is to move 
domain (4) hazards in the direction of domain (3) so they can become 
subject of information gathering. 
Finally, hazards in domain (5)/Noumenon, may suddenly be 
revealed by a coincidence, or by simply looking at the right place on the 
right time. Then something noticed can be recognized as belonging to a 
hazard. This requires an alert and receptive safety engineer. Domain (5) 
hazards may also remain hidden in the mysterious outskirts of reality 
Table 1 
Proposed unknown-ness scale compared to three existing scales.  
Domain Origin 1 2 3 4 5 
Reality in Greek 
philosophy 
Phenomenon Known 
reality 
Noumenon Unknown 
Reality Stages Peirce 
(1867) 
Phenomenon Known 
reality 
Thirdness Recognizing patterns, 
allowing naming, connecting, 
grouping, classification, arranging, 
explaining, predicting and anticipating 
Secondness Relations between 
facts and observable things, 
exposing differences, objects 
and interactions 
Firstness Condition, 
existence, possibility, not 
yet thought about, 
understood or described 
Noumenon 
Unknown 
EPSC awareness 
versus knowledge 
matrix (Gowland, 
2011) 
KK 
Known knowns 
UK 
Unknown knowns 
KU 
Known unknowns 
UU 
Unknown unknowns 
Reality mapping 
Hansen (2018) 
Ontic 
Cognitive, every day, 
facts, empirical 
evidence, sure known 
Ontology 
Learning, debating, new terms, new 
things 
Intuition coincidental finds, 
changing values and views, 
passive listening, 
Mystery 
Apophatic thinking, open mind, wonder 
Proposed 
Unknown-ness 
Scale (this study) 
Practice 
Ontic 
Cognitive, every day, 
facts, empirical 
evidence, sure known. 
Learn 
Ontology, Thirdness, debating, new 
terms, new things, 
Unknown knowns. 
Intuition Secondness, sense, 
coincidental finds, changing 
values and views, Known 
unknowns. 
Mystery 
Firstness, 
Passive listening, apophatic 
thinking, open mind, 
wonder, Unknown 
unknowns. 
Noumenon 
Open mind, 
wonder, 
Mystery. 
Unknown 
unknowns, 
Unknowable  
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where nobody happens to be looking in the rare case a hidden danger 
shows. In domain (5) meaningful planned action is not possible except 
keeping an open mind to remain able to notice any mystery revealing 
part of itself. 
4.5. Example 
As an example to illustrate how the inventory in Table 2 can be 
interpreted, extended and used in practice, the “Danger we are not aware 
of but could be if we thought about it” mentioned in the first inventory line 
of domain (4) is used here. The proposed action for domain (4) risks is: 
“Use intuition, be curious, creative and suspicious. Attempt to bring 
your notions to Secondness/domain (3) “. This would lead to the 
following course of action: 
The safety engineer, aiming at the new and unknown safety horizon, 
could gather a few critical and knowledgeable people and walk around 
the plant together. This curious and creative team can ask each other 
questions about anything they see underway that might have a bearing 
on safety. This safety walk (Kletz, 2001) is a routine in many companies. 
Generated notes, questions and remarks should not be restrained, 
excluded or criticized however. Afterwards, the safety engineer gathers 
the subjects addressed by the participants and checks if these are already 
mentioned in the existing inventory list of ‘unknown’ risks (see initial 
Table 2 
Risk inventory and action list (RIAL) showing unmitigated hazards identified in 
the chemical industry (after Lindhout and Reniers, 2017A), their domain allo-
cation on the unknown-ness scale and a proposed action approach.  
Risk Inventory and Action List (RIAL) 
Unknown-ness SCALE Unmitigated hazards 
inventory 
Proposed action approach 
Domain 1 Practice, 
Phenomenon, 
Ontic, Known’s, KK 
[Known and correctly 
controlled generic risk] 
Remaining risks of known 
and probabilistic controlled 
danger 
New compulsory safety 
measures not yet taken by 
companies 
Known danger currently 
excluded by the regulator 
Known danger being ignored 
as a risk 
Known danger previously 
excluded by the regulator 
but currently included 
Non-compliant measures 
allowed and not noticed by 
the regulator 
Risk improperly controlled 
and in excess of acceptance 
level 
Known danger as yet 
unmitigated waiting on the 
action list 
Take action to reduce 
and/or control these risks. 
Apply: Excellent risk 
management (Blokland 
and Reniers, 2013) 
Domain 2 Learn, 
Thirdness, 
Ontology, Unknown 
Knowns, UK 
Measures announced but not 
yet prescribed by legislation 
or standards Danger too 
unlikely to occur to be under 
risk-control 
Danger not considered 
because of economic or 
strategic reasons 
Measures not taken for well- 
known frequently occurring 
accident types 
Danger due to improper use 
of additional risk calculation 
factors 
Danger due to cost cutting on 
safety critical items 
Danger due to outdated 
classification in accident 
investigation 
Known danger remaining 
unmitigated due to failing 
countermeasures 
Known risk improperly 
controlled due to wrong 
chance or effect data 
Measures not up to the state 
of the art 
Measures no longer state of 
the art but still allowed by 
outdated permits 
Danger due to standard- 
rather than specific hazard 
inventory 
Danger due to improperly 
conducted safety studies 
Risks exceeding acceptance 
level due to uncertainties in 
the assessment 
Known danger not fully 
neutralized the deterministic 
way 
Danger caused by unsafe 
behaviour 
Danger due to overestimated 
barrier performance 
Rare but occurred scenario 
Investigate these risks, 
plan for bringing them 
under control and bring 
them to phenomenon 
domain (1). 
Apply: Just Culture ( 
Dekker, 2012)  
Table 2 (continued ) 
Risk Inventory and Action List (RIAL) 
not identified in company 
risk inventory 
Domain 3 Intuition, 
Secondness, Known 
Unknown’s, KU 
Unknown danger due to loss 
of expertise with change of 
personnel 
Unknown danger due to staff 
unfamiliar with intricacies of 
old/new plant 
Unknown danger due to 
interface problems during 
building the plant 
Unknown danger due to 
exceeding the design lifetime 
of a plant 
Unknown danger due to lost 
overview of risk inventory by 
subcontracting 
Unknown danger due to 
underreporting of danger 
Unknown danger due to poor 
registration of incidents 
Unknown danger caused by 
new technology 
Unknown danger due to 
wrong assumptions for scale- 
up 
Study these risks by 
observing & recording 
finds, change thinking on 
views and values, 
gathering information to 
bring them to Thirdness 
domain (2.) 
Apply: Questioning 
attitudes (Bierly and 
Spender, 1995) 
Domain 4 Mystery, 
Firstness, 
Unknown’s, UU 
Danger we are not aware of 
but could be if we thought 
about it 
Ignorance at both company 
and regulator sides 
Danger remaining 
undiscovered due to low 
regulator priority 
Unknown design flaws 
Underestimated risk 
Danger obscured by 
information overload 
All other possible things that 
could go wrong but were not 
identified 
Use intuition, be curious, 
creative and suspicious. 
Attempt to bring your 
notions to Secondness 
domain (3). 
Apply: HRO approach ( 
Weick et al., 2008; Turner 
and Pidgeon, 1997) 
Domain 5 Noumenon, 
UU, Unknowable 
Unknown danger nobody 
could possibly know about 
Keeping an open mind at 
all times, wonder about 
the mystery (Hansen, 
2018). 
If one appears place it in 
Firstness domain (4).  
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list example in Table 2). New subjects are added to the bottom of the list 
in domain (4). Subjects that were raised earlier are placed higher on the 
inventory list, thus getting more priority. Any such prioritized subject 
requires a short discussion in a regular safety management meeting to 
agree on how to further investigate this signalled issue and its potential 
risk. This brings the issue from domain (4) on the inventory list to 
domain (3) where -over time-more information is gathered about it. 
Next follows a traditional research effort in domain (2) and finally, risk 
management will start once the danger is brought to domain (1). These 
steps constitute the steps of a systematic process which is gradually 
bringing unknown, hence uncontrolled, risks towards the centre domain 
(1) where they can be turned into actions by the company safety man-
agement system. 
5. Discussion 
Having the uncontrolled risk types identified, listed and prioritized, 
how can safety managers move forward ? The proposed action approach 
brings existing but hitherto unknown risks out in the open. 
Hence, first of all it is advisable to synchronize watches with com-
pany management. Suddenly looking beyond the existing company 
safety horizon might open a Pandora’s Box of safety issues. Normally in 
a company, facing fierce competition, any surprise that could cost 
money is most unwelcome. The evidence of a positive relation between 
safety excellence and economic return needs pointing out (Fernández--
Muñiz et al., 2009). 
The second thing would be to adapt both the company management 
view and perspective towards non-acceptability of unknown risks, 
directly followed by changing their view on the world of major hazards. 
Any company management could be inspired by Hansen (2018) and 
simply not stop wondering about the dark and gloomy mystery staring 
them in the face every day. 
And then, thirdly, there is important work to do: actively and sys-
tematically looking for new horizons and new scenario’s. For the safety 
engineers it is all about getting to the full depth of their individual 
passion for safety (King and Artym, 2003): respecting the environment 
and protecting and saving peoples’ lives, preferably the ethical way. In 
Table 2, the right hand column action approach can be used as a tool to 
systematically work on reduction of the unknown-ness in the uncon-
trolled risk inventory, adding measures as necessary. This tool allows 
continuously and systematically improving safety, as opposed to coming 
to a halt by settling for the existence of ‘unknown risk’ and accepting it 
as ‘fate’ or ‘a fact of life’. In other words: increasing the risk appetite 
(Gjerdrum and Peter, 2011), as in industry, a lack of “risk appetite” 
leaves risks unmitigated and this practical and systematic approach is 
expected to help the safety engineer to work on this more effectively. 
The ongoing multidirectional scientific research for better risk con-
trol paradigms, concepts and methods does not interfere with this 
practice oriented approach. On the contrary, the authors contend that 
the method proposed here does not exclude any of them. The risk in-
ventory and action list, as presented in Table 2, although not yet com-
plete for a specific company, does offer a beginning. The safety engineer 
needs to be inquisitive, always on the lookout for new subjects on the 
horizon to investigate and add them to this inventory. Big-data and new 
smart technology might be used to assist this work (Figueres-Esteban 
et al., 2018; El Rashidy et al., 2017). 
Participatory action research (PAR) may be a possible tool to eval-
uate pilot studies in industry with the proposed action approach based 
on Table 2 (Borda, 2006; Kemmis et al., 2014; Reza, 2007). 
As industry keeps developing new ways to handle hazardous sub-
stances, new hazards, new insights, and new known-as well as known- 
unknown risks emerge all the time. Risk entropy and dynamism neces-
sitate abandonment of the static one-off risk assessment. In this way any 
risk can be included in the proposed risk inventory and action list 
(RIAL). Hence, over time, also the hitherto deemed unknown safety risks 
can be systematically brought under control. 
6. Conclusion 
The immediacy of the stagnating long term downward major acci-
dent rate trend, as observed in the Netherlands and Belgium, underlines 
the need to address the uncontrolled risks caused by various safety 
management pitfalls as mentioned in this study. Current safety practice 
is apparently not effective enough to leave the current plateau in the 
long term incident rate trend. Both companies and regulators not only 
need to do better in their current ways, but, moreover, need to be more 
eager in systematic reduction of currently unidentified and unknown 
risks, in order to accomplish further dropping of the major accident rate. 
Although no final closure can be reached here, the main conclusion for 
now is that both the safety engineer and safety management can never 
be ready with hazard identification and risk assessment. Finding a 
sound, safe and systematic way forward may require the combined 
strength of ‘old school’ philosophical inquisitiveness and new ‘multi-para-
digm’ systems thinking. Finally, the fundamental question remains 
whether any risk assessment will ever be complete. 
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